In the analog world, handwritten signatures are typically added at the end of the document. This has one major downside: it is possible to exchange all pages before the signed page with arbitrary content. This exchange is impossible when using digital signatures because digital signatures protect the entire content of a document. So it is assumed that such an attack from the analog world cannot be transferred to digital signatures.
We show that this assumption is incorrect by introducing a new attack class: *Shadow Attacks*. The idea of Shadow Attacks is that the attackers create a PDF document with two different contents:
The Signers of the PDF receive the document, review it, and sign it. The attackers use the signed document, modify it slightly, and send it to the victims. After opening the signed PDF, the victims check whether the digital signature was successfully verified. However, the victims see different content than the Signers.
Based on the attacks that we discovered in Feb 2019, the PDF applications analyze the changes made after signing and try to estimate if these changes are legitimate. For instance, overwriting content on a page of the document is not allowed and thus leads to invalid signature verification. Nevertheless, some changes are considered harmless by the PDF applications and do not throw any warnings. We analyzed these legitimate changes and abused these to exchange the entire content within a PDF document.
During our research, we identified 15 out of 28 desktop viewer applications vulnerable to at least one of our attacks. You can find the detailed results of our evaluation on the following web page: Desktop Viewer Applications
We started a responsible disclosure procedure on 2nd of March 2020. In cooperation with the CERT-Bund, we contacted all vendors, provided proof-of-concept exploits, and helped them to fix the issues. The attacks are documented in CVE-2020-9592 and CVE-2020-9596.
You can find the report and all exploits on the following web page: Report and Exploits to test your application.
If you use another Reader, you should contact the support team for your application. Alternatively, you can use the provided Exploits to test your application.
To guarantee confidentiality, PDF files can be encrypted. This enables the secure transfer and storing of sensitive documents without any further protection mechanisms.
The key management between the sender and recipient may be password based (the recipient must know the password used by the sender, or it must be transferred to them through a secure channel) or public key based (i.e., the sender knows the X.509 certificate of the recipient).
In this research, we analyze the security of encrypted PDF files and show how an attacker can exfiltrate the content without having the corresponding keys.
The security problems known as PDFex discovered by our research can be summarized as follows:
Even without knowing the corresponding password, the attacker possessing an encrypted PDF file can manipulate parts of it.
More precisely, the PDF specification allows the mixing of ciphertexts with plaintexts. In combination with further PDF features which allow the loading of external resources via HTTP, the attacker can run direct exfiltration attacks once a victim opens the file.
PDF encryption uses the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption mode with no integrity checks, which implies ciphertext malleability.
This allows us to create self-exfiltrating ciphertext parts using CBC malleability gadgets. We use this technique not only to modify existing plaintext but to construct entirely new encrypted objects.
You can use the following logo for referencing the PDFex attacks (Creative Commons Licence).
Further providers like IBM offer PDF encryption services for PDF documents and other data (e.g., confidential images) by wrapping them into PDF. PDF encryption is also supported in different medical products to transfer health records, for example Innoport, Ricoh, Rimage.
Due to the shortcomings regarding the deployment and usability of S/MIME and OpenPGP email encryption, some organizations use special gateways to automatically encrypt email messages as encrypted PDF attachments, for example CipherMail, Encryptomatic, NoSpamProxy. The password to decrypt these PDFs can be transmitted over a second channel, such as a text message (i.e., SMS).
In order to measure the impact of the vulnerabilities in the PDF specification, we analyzed 27 widely used PDF viewers. We found 23 of them (85%) to be vulnerable to direct exfiltration attacks and all of them to be vulnerable to CBC gadgets.
You can find the detailed results of our evaluation here.
We strictly followed the responsible disclosure procedure by reporting the results on 17th of May 2019. In cooperation with the CERT-Bund, we contacted all affected vendors, provided proof-of-concept exploits, and helped them to mitigate the issues.
You can take a look at which PDF Reader you are using and compare the versions, see Evaluation.
If you use another Reader, you should contact the support team for your application.
If you open a PDF document and your viewer displays a panel (like you see below) indicating that
During recent research, we found out that this is not the case for almost all PDF Desktop Viewers and most Online Validation Services.
With our attacks, we can use an existing signed document (e.g., amazon.de invoice) and change the content of the document arbitrarily without invalidating the signatures. Thus, we can forge a document signed by firstname.lastname@example.org to refund us one trillion dollars.
To detect the attack, you would need to be able to read and understand the PDF format in depth. Most people are probably not capable of such thing (PDF file example).
To recap this, you can use any signed PDF document and create a document which contains arbitrary content in the name of the signing user, company, ministry or state.
Important: To verify the signature you need to trust the amazon.de certificate, which you would if you get signed PDFs from Amazon, otherwise the signature is still valid, but the certificate is not trusted. Furthermore, due to our responsible disclosure process, most applications already implemented countermeasure against our attack, you can find a vulnerable Adobe Acrobat DC Reader version here.
Since 2014, organizations delivering public digital services in an EU member state are required to support digitally signed documents such as PDF files by law (eIDAS).
In Austria, every governmental authority digitally signs any document §19. Also, any new law is legally valid after its announcement within a digitally signed PDF. Several countries like Brazil, Canada, the Russian Federation, and Japan also use and accept digitally signed documents.
The US government protects PDF files with PDF signatures, and individuals can report tax withholdings by signing and submitting a PDF.
Outside Europe, Forbes calls the electronic signature and digital transactions company DocuSign as No. 4 in its Cloud 100 list. Many companies sign every document they deliver (e.g., Amazon, Decathlon, Sixt). Standardization documents, such as ISO and DIN, are also protecting by PDF signatures. Even in the academic world, PDF signatures are sometimes used to sign scientific papers (e.g., ESORICS proceedings).
According to Adobe Sign, the company processed 8 billion electronic and digital signatures in 2017 alone.
Currently, we are not aware of any exploits using our attacks.
We evaluated our attacks against two types of applications. The commonly known desktop applications everyone uses on a daily bases and online validation services. The last one is often used in the business world to validate the signature of a PDF document returning a validation report as a result.
During our research, we identified 21 out of 22 desktop viewer applications and 5 out of 7 online validation services vulnerable against at least one of our attacks.
You can find the detailed results of our evaluation on the following web pages:
As part of our research, we started a responsible disclosure procedure on 9th October 2018, after we identified 21 out 22 desktop viewer applications and 5 out of 7 online validation services vulnerable against at least one of our attacks.
In cooperation with the CERT-Bund, we contacted all vendors, provided proof-of-concept exploits, and helped them to fix the issues.
You can take a look at which PDF Reader you are using and compare the versions. If you use one of our analyzed Desktop Viewer Applications you already should have got an update for you Reader.
If you use another Reader, you should contact the support team for your application.